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Prior to receiving a memorandum from the Director of Risk
Management that the libraries would be included in a
university-wide risk assessment study, the authors’ only
contacts with the director had to do with art works housed
in the library and the amount of money kept on-hand at the
service desks. We believed that the Risk Assessment
Office was primarily concerned with highly vulnerable
programs such as the hospitals, pharmacies, athletics, the
bookstore, and laboratories. The challenge for us now
would be to develop a comprehensive assessment of risks
in library facilities and operations from acquisitions and
cataloging to circulation, interlibrary loan, reference, and
archives.
Although the authors and library supervisors did not have
university risk assessment guidelines or policies to base
decision-making on, we, perhaps intuitively, considered
risks when developing library policies or procedures which
involved collecting money at a service desk, ordering and
receiving of educational materials and supplies, handling
rare books, and picking-up large gift collections from
donors. But until receiving the notice that the libraries
were included in the university-wide assessment study, the
authors had no plans to lead such a study. We quite frankly
questioned the need for the libraries to be included in the
consultant’s study because we collect very little money,
have very few chemicals or other hazards in the libraries,
and do not put employees or patrons at-risk like hospitals
do.
Our question was answered by the consultant at our first
meeting. The primary reasons why the libraries were
included in the study were due to the monetary value of
materials ordered throughout the fiscal year, the value of all
materials in the Doy Leale McCall Rare Book and
Manuscript Library (McCall Library), as well as total
revenue from fines, lost books, interlibrary loans, and copy
cards. News headlines about thefts from library rare book
rooms contrasted with the common perception that libraries
were quiet, safe places where users can locate research
articles, find information, or study without putting
themselves in danger. Librarians themselves may have
entered the field with similar expectations.
Rather, library administrators are likely to believe that the
most significant risks they face are natural disasters such as
hurricanes, tornadoes, fires, floods, or earthquakes. In
coastal areas, for instance, collections may be at risk from
high humidity, pests, or other conditions that pose a risk to
collections. The threat of active shooters or terrorists who
could enter the library with weapons is likely to be
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regarded as even more dangerous and more likely to occur
in today’s environment than natural disasters.
The most common and age-old threat that librarians take
into consideration may be theft of materials by patrons.
Library staff may not have the inclination, nor the time, to
monitor patron behavior. It is easier to believe that students
come to academic libraries to study, do research, or read—
not to steal books, razor cut articles from bound journals,
and so forth. (Those are crimes of opportunity, as well as
less prevalent in the digital age.) Nevertheless, security
systems for decades have been regarded as necessities,
rather than frills by academic and other library
administrators to prevent theft. High risk areas such as
manuscript collections, rare book rooms, and supply rooms
are often monitored by video surveillance systems installed
to deter theft, or to track it when it occurs.
Counter measures, on the one hand, may be only as good as
the people enforcing, monitoring, or implementing them.
On the other hand, few if any counter measures may stop
something from happening. Hurricanes, flooding, HVAC
leaks, roof leaks, active shooters, and theft occur. Take
theft as an example, installing video surveillance systems
are not likely to stop determined and knowledgeable
thieves from stealing students’ laptops. Surveillance
systems may, however, be deterrents to would-be thieves.
Installing anti-theft measures on works of framed art are no
more likely to prevent someone wanting the piece from
ripping-off the frame to steal it. Deterrents, by definition,
help to prevent or limit damage, theft, and crimes from
happening. The authors certainly want to touch on many of
the topics such as these, but we primarily want to focus on
how we went about assessing risk and developing countermeasures that we found appropriate.
Case Background - The Consultant
In late 2014, the Director of Risk Management notified
twenty-three key university administrators that the Marsh
Risk Consulting (MRCO) was hired to conduct a campuswide strategic risk assessment and analysis. The
administrators were scheduled to meet with the consultant
during the last week of January 2015. The administrative
staff included those in the offices of the president, the vicepresidents, the internal auditor, computer services, financial
aid, facilities management, housing, human resources,
athletics, engineering and design, purchasing, public
relations. The Dean of University Libraries and Director of
the McCall Library (who reports to the dean) also were
scheduled to meet with the consultant.
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The consultant’s sessions were designed to generate an
open dialogue about risks to the University. He defined a
“risk” as follows: (a) the probability of threat of damage,
(b) injury, liability, (c) loss, or (d) any other negative
consequence that was caused by external or internal
vulnerabilities, and that may or may not be avoided through
preemptive action.
Risks were further categorized as: (a) strategic, (b)
financial, (c) operational or (d) hazard.
The latter
represents a potential source of harm to the health of a
person or persons, or to a university asset. An operational
risk was associated with an internal, external, system, or
employee failure. An employee, for example, who does not
comply with a university policy or an environmental or
safety law may put himself, or others, at risk. There might
be a financial risk to non-compliance as well. Besides
thinking of these risk categories, the key administrators
were asked to be prepared to discuss two questions with the
consultant: What critical risks did you foresee for the
activities of your department or field of University
operations? In general, what critical risks did you foresee
for overall University operations and activities? Another
parameter of the consultant’s role was to determine what
countermeasures the department, school or college took, if
any, to mitigate the risks that were cited.
University Background
A relatively young institution, the USA was founded in
1963 in Mobile, Alabama, becoming the first state
supported public institution for higher education in south
Alabama. The university has grown from one building in
1963 to a sprawling campus in west Mobile, as well as two
hospitals and a cancer institute located in mid-town Mobile.
Enrollment today tops 16,000 students (head count). With
clinics, the physicians and hospitals comprising the USA
Health System cared for more than 250,000 people in 2015.
Nine colleges and schools provide quality education in
business, computing, arts and sciences, education,
engineering, nursing, the allied health professions, and
medicine. USA offers 12 doctoral degrees, a Medical
Doctor (MD) degree, 32 master’s degrees, an Education
Specialist degree, and various programs leading to 53
baccalaureate degrees. With over 5,500 employees, USA
has a payroll of $400 million. External contracts and grants
are over $50 million annually. As a charter member of the
Sun Belt Conference in 1976, the university fields 17
Division 1 sports teams, including football, baseball,
basketball, tennis, soccer, softball, and volleyball.
The rapid growth of USA over such a very short time is
certainly the backdrop for the need to look at risks.
Realization of the need led to the establishment in the
1990’s of the Office of Risk Management and Insurance.
Outside of this office, however, risk assessment has not
been a formal process, or responsibility, assigned to anyone
in most administrative or academic offices with the
exception of medical facilities. Risk insurance and claims,
for example, are handled by central administration for cost
saving purposes.

Other academic administrators at USA have to consider
risks and risk avoidance as a normal or natural aspect of
decision making. However, in higher education, many
university administrators probably rose to their positions
based on their academic merit and without the benefit of
management education or training, much less risk
management training. So, with such diversity of programs
and facilities, it made sense for central administration to
look to deans, directors, and department heads to assess and
manage risks and threats, at least in selected vulnerable
programs.
Library Background
From a couple of rooms in the USA’s first building (1964),
library services and resources have grown exponentially. A
large four story facility was built in 1968. When its
capacity looked like it would be reached by the early 1990s
plans were made to expand by renovating a residence hall
near the newly constructed College of Medicine facility for
a bio-medical library. By 2000, the Biomedical Library
collections were growing quickly, as were the information
needs of the doctors, nurses and other medical personnel,
so information resources were made available at the
Medical Center and Children’s & Women’s Hospital for
use by medical staff.
With donations of many thousands of photographs and
negatives and manuscripts, as well as university archives, a
separate archives was finally formed in the late 1980s. It is
now called the Doy Leale McCall Rare Book and
Manuscript Library in recognition of a highly valued
collection of early Alabama historical manuscripts, slave
records, and books appraised at over $3.1 million.
Finally, a small collection of business related books and
current journals were moved from the Marx Library to the
Mitchell College of Business when it was renovated in
2008 for a Learning Resource Center.
Literature Review
The authors searched for similar case studies in the
literature. Our literature review revealed a rich bibliography
of articles and books about topics such as library security,
natural risks, library crime, disaster preparedness, risk
assessment, risk insurance, prevention, and the
countermeasures that were used to reduce library risks,
particularly with respect to protecting collections. We
found two very good manuals and starting points for
librarians, library managers, and library boards included a
manual by Breighner, Payton, Drewes, and Myers (2005)
and a guide by Kahn (2008). In each, the authors defined
risk identification and management, the process, cost
avoidance, loss prevention and control, risk, property
valuation, handling claims, and the like
Kahn’s (2008) manual included a section on external risks
such as plantings, ramps, lighting and walkways and
possible counter-measures. His discussion of internal areas
such as stairwells, windows, mechanical rooms, and
lighting was noteworthy. If the reader were to buy only one
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book on overall risk management, Kahn’s (2008) library
and security guide would be a good choice.
A study by Raffensperger (2010) examined the level of risk
based on property and violent crimes using Clery Act data
and Uniform Crime Report data. He compared campus
crime rates in academic environments with general crime
rates. From this data-driven approach, he developed a
model for risk assessment, prioritization of efforts, and
prevention. However, this article did not help to develop
the risk assessment analysis needed for a case study
approach.
A book by Shuman (1999) differs in orientation, looking
largely at crimes of theft, prevention, policies, and
procedures from a broad legal, security, and behavioral
perspective and with an eye toward developing a
comprehensive security plan. Shuman also discussed
electronic security issues and solutions, as well as the
future of library security. The author provided a very
comprehensive bibliography for those who want to be
experts in such matters.
A SPEC kit by Soete and Zimmerman (1999) for the
Association of Research Libraries (ARL) surveyed 45 of
122 members and provided a number of documents or
forms used to illustrate incident reports, emergency closing
policies, bomb recognition points, recovery responsibilities,
attempted theft procedures, and many similar procedures or
policies regarding use or misuse of computer, theft of
library materials, use of fire extinguishers, and so forth.
The SPEC kit, however, did not present results, or a
methodology, the authors could utilize in preparing for a
risk assessment, particularly because USA is not an ARL
library.
The American Institute for Conservation of Historic and
Artistic Work (AIC) offers any person access to its Risk
Evaluation Planning Program (REPP) site questionnaire;
just completing it can reveal lacunae in staff and
emergency preparedness, policies, procedures, fire safety,
and environment.
The National Center for Preservation Technology offers a
free online program and easy-to-use template useful for
institutions that want to develop a comprehensive disaster
plan (dPlan). Its preservation leaflets provides free advice
on a variety of preservation topics, as well as links to
additional resources.
Methodology
The authors prepared a preliminary outline listing risks by
departments or areas as follows: (a) General, (b)
Acquisitions, receiving, cataloging, processing; (c)
Archives, rare book & special collections; (d) Art and art
galleries; (e) Circulation (access services); (f) Interlibrary
loan; (g) Loading and receiving areas; (h) Printing and
copying; (i) Stacks, office, and other areas; (j) Systems;
and (k) Travel. This list served as a checklist to help assure
that major areas were not overlooked in the process.
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Under each heading, we identified the most obvious risks
such as theft, mutilation, ordering library materials for
personal use, using library supplies and hardware for
personal use, improper use of photocopying machines, and
the like. The authors presented this list at the initial meeting
(January 2015) of department head and asked department
heads to help flesh-out a libraries risk assessment strategy,
provide additional input, as well as assist in developing
countermeasures in their respective departments.
Library Department Assessment Results
Not having been faced with disasters like Katrina since
2005, library administration and department heads first
surveyed risks from theft, unsecured doors, electrical
hazards, and other easy to identify risks—the “low hanging
fruit”. Seeing too many devices plugged into an outlet or
electrical strip, for instance, is easy to spot. USA
employees a safety officer and staff who periodically
inspect university offices for potential hazards. The safety
office staff are always willing to offer advice on counter
measures to prevent circuit overloads, fire, or other failures.
These staff will also review door and window hardware and
provide suggestions as to how to improve room security,
access and egress. Such assistance may be far more
valuable than the advice offered by a manual or website
because the advice is specific to the problem or need. As a
result, work orders can be initiated to correct safety
concerns, or improve security.
There are more ordinary risks or threats associated with
matters not normally thought of as threatening. Such
decisions as scheduling library hours of operation, the
implementing of new programs and policies, and pickingup gift books from donors are examples. To illustrate one
of these examples, we considered a very common issue in
academic libraries: extending library hours. At USA, for
instance, this matter arises nearly every year during student
government association elections, when at least one
candidate runs on a platform of extending library hours.
By staying open 24 x 7 or 24 x 5 the library staff and users
at USA would be more likely to be exposed to increased
security risks such as assaults or muggings. If adding a
third shift (without hiring additional staff) decreased
staffing available for daytime programs, there would be
new challenges, particularly when existing staff are ill or on
vacation. Hiring student assistants to do the work of
classified staff at the circulation desk, for example, is likely
in increase mistakes made in taking payments for fines and
lost books at the circulation desk. Regardless, library
administration on principle should limit risk by imposing
stricter cash register and accounting rules to limit
opportunities for theft.
A related risk was failing to provide timely and proper
training of employees regardless of category (student, partor full-time staff, professional or paraprofessional).
Carefully training and supervising staff responsible for
accounts receivable, ordering library materials, or receiving
materials should always be regarded as good safeguards
against theft. We made sure that staff who order materials
are different from those who do the receiving.
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We examined whether we allow library staff to use their
own vehicles to box and pick-up gift collections at donors’
homes or offices. This practice at the very least raises
insurance liability questions and could, of course, result in
injury, absenteeism and workmen’s compensation issues.
This is particularly sensitive because many library
employees are older and, hence, more vulnerable to back
injury. So, library administration now carefully approaches
donors when they express interest in donating large
collections and try to have the donors be responsible for
delivering the gift collection to the library. When this is
not possible, we ask student assistants to help or work with
university personnel to pick-up the material.
It is the responsibility of library administrators and
department heads when making decisions to always
consider a diverse array of environmental, behavioral,
finance, personnel, and legal factors that pose risks. Such
factors are not always obvious at first blush. While it may
seem perfectly reasonable, for instance, to approve having
food and wine for a reception at the library, university
policies should be checked before giving approval. This is
because university libraries do not have liquor licenses, but
they do have underage students studying who might attend
the reception. Another reason may be that university
contracts with food vendors who have equirements or
policies restricting what is, or is not, permissible.
While unaware of any academic libraries that currently
employ metal detectors or armed guards to prevent
terrorism or acts of violence, library administrators years
ago replaced staff or student guards with security gates that
alarm when an item leaves that has not been desensitized.
Will library administrators go full circle and once again
hire armed security guards in an attempt to protect their
facilities from violence or active shooters scenarios? In any
case, it is expected that library directors today do realize
that active shooters are just as likely to visit the library as
they would any other facility on their campus.
This case study is concerned with the counter-measures that
the Marx Library took to avoid or limit risk. Library
administrators have developed many counter-measures to
prevent, or limit, associated risks (See Appendix 1).
Among these are security systems, video surveillance
systems, lockable supply cabinets, and cash register, all
intended to protect library property by limiting theft. In
some cases, these same counter-measures may also help
prevent or minimize new forms of risk such as active
shooter scenarios.
Mobile, Alabama, is at risk of hurricanes for much of the
year and has an “Emergency Response and Recovery Plan”
(April 2015) in place as a guideline for handling a variety
of campus-wide emergencies, including hurricanes. This
publication also discusses bomb threats, the university’s
notification system, hostage situations, hazmat incidents,
and other weather conditions. Library employees are asked
periodically to study this manual. The Safety Office has
planned or surprise drills to help employees prepare for
such events. In 2015, for instance, a planned bomb threat in

Marx Library was coordinated between university, city,
county and other offices.
The President of USA is responsible for the overall
direction of the campus’ emergency preparation and
response and recovery plan. In the case of a hurricane,
therefore, the USA libraries themselves take direction from
the President’s Council of key personnel. This group makes
decisions about cancelling classes, closing campus,
directing staff and students to designated safe buildings,
and so forth as the situation dictates. After the hurricane,
damage is reported by all building facility managers,
overall damage is assessed university wide, and appropriate
corrective actions (counter measures) are developed and
approved to handle reports of damage, re-entry to campus
and buildings, resumption of classes, insurance claims, and
so forth.
Systems
Data preservation of bibliographic databases is not
addressed in the most recent risk assessment by the
consultant. Our online catalog is hosted and not managed
on site. The vendor of the hosting service provides
technical support, including full backups and other data
security measures as well as physical security of the server
itself.
The list of countermeasures addressed in the Marx Library
Risk Assessment does not address in detail violent
situations like that of an assault/attack, active shooter or
bomb threat, and so on. Those types of events require
different responses and will certainly involve local/campus
police, fire department and emergency medical support.
The reporting requirements for these events are also
different.
The first example shows the current risks for the Marx
Library Systems department. They include:
•
•
•
•

Theft or damage to computers (including thin
clients) and related equipment such as printers,
scanners, card readers, etc.
Misuse of computers (including thin clients) such
as downloading pornography or sending
malware/viruses.
Hacking of library catalog leading to possible
corruption or theft of patron and financial data
including fines, purchases, invoice, etc.
Theft of software.

There are a diverse number of countermeasures that the
USA libraries take to limit risk. Use of password
protection, authentication, and user verification help protect
library computers/users. While a single-sign-on provides a
stronger level of protection, the university has not yet
implemented this capability.
Video surveillance of high risk areas where there are many
computers has proven to be a very useful tool in preventing
theft or catching thieves. Video surveillance is useful
because few libraries provide trained security staff to
actively monitor exits, stacks, and areas that need to be
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surveilled. No exception, the Marx Library has very good
video surveillance of these areas, but no one is actively
reviewing the video feed. Nonetheless, video surveillance
systems are expensive and must be updated. Marx
Library’s first video surveillance system, installed in 2004,
was an analog system which required images to be stored
on a codec in the library. It was replaced in 2014 by a
digital system; now the video can be viewed over the
internet from a number of locations, including the
university police station. This counter-measure is reactive.
In other words, checking a video feed occurs after
something happens, to identify the perpetrators, crime, time
and date. While not perfect, this deterrent is effective.
Because of limited library staff during evening and
weekend hours, the system is the first line of defense.
Signage is used to alert users to the presence of the video
surveillance system. The system, in fact, is more of a
deterrent than the presence of library staff because users
know it records who comes and goes.
Another reason why theft of computers or damage to them
is limited is because computers and computer labs are
ubiquitous on the USA campus, including residence halls.
In addition, USA students are required to have access to a
privately owned computer. The Marx Library’s computer
lab and public workstations, located throughout the
building, offer convenience to students who are more likely
to have a laptop or workstation in their room or home.
Replacing higher value computers with thin clients, which
are less costly long term, and lack operational capability
when disconnected from the network, were also deployed.
When installed these devices connect to a central VM
server housed in the Computer Support Center computer
room. This server delivers access to software and research
tools through the thin client. Without access to a similar
server, these devices are useless.
Where thin clients are not appropriate, computers are used.
Each has anti-virus and anti-malware software installed.
While neither software tool is 100% effective, they provide
some protection. Additionally, Deep freeze software is
installed on all computers. Whenever a computer is
rebooted, anything changed or loaded by an ordinary user is
deleted and the machine reverts to its original
configuration. Anti-theft devices are installed on devices in
public areas; they secure computers and thin clients to each
other and furniture or other generally immovable objects.
Marx Library’s electronic classroom and computer lab are
locked unless library student employees or staff/faculty are
available to supervise access and use. One equipped study
room (ML 123) has a projector and computer. This room is
kept locked when not in use, and the key must be checkout
(like a book) by eligible users (USA students, faculty and
staff). Users are required to return the key afterwards in
order to leave and retrieve their ID card.
Although limited, the university does provide some data
preservation and protection. Each individual who is
employed by the Marx Library has access to a network
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drive for data storage. It is an individual’s responsibility to
backup files and other data.
Circulation Department and Stacks
The staff in the circulation departments of Marx Library
and the Biomedical Library are largely responsible for
building security and safety because they staff the libraries
during all hours of operation. It is important, therefore, that
they become very familiar with the USA Emergency
Responses and Recovery Plan (2015). All staff are
encouraged by library administration to stay familiar with
the policies and procedures in the manual because it covers
all types of emergencies, including violent crimes, bomb
threats, gas leaks, explosions, reporting emergencies, and
the campus notification system.
The circulation desks at these libraries is where payments
are taken for fines, lost books, copy cards, copying,
interlibrary loan payments, and the like. Reducing the
number of collection points throughout the libraries has
always been a major factor in limiting risk and a practice
encouraged by the university’s internal auditors.
Nonetheless, the university’s internal auditor and risk
management officer have always regarded the libraries as
at-risk--although at low risk compared to the bookstore, or
where student tuition and fees are centrally collected on
campus.
Most security measures at circulation desks will not stop
determined thieves because they know that there is money
in the cash register or drawer. Access is limited to full-time
staff in order to limit risk. In Marx Library, there is a very
secure bank vault that is used to store the cash drawer
overnight, but the other libraries do not have this option.
The faculty reserves materials are kept nearby as well and
include special items, including items owned privately by
teaching faculty. Some may be rare and even valuable.
Another risk is that fines may be expunged from the ILS or
finance systems like banner by trained circulation staff
without permission.
Collecting money requires careful handling and training of
staff. Even if there is no malicious intent, staff may make
mistakes when counting money, making deposits, and the
like. Two library staff members are responsible for
counting the money, making deposits and locking the cash
in the safe at the end of the day. In this situation, such
requirements and habits are strong deterrents vis-à-vis only
having one person being responsible. We limit handling
fines or money to library staff (not student assistants).
Constant supervision of the Circulation area is maintained
and a minimum of one staff member is on duty at all times.
The libraries print/copy cards are not free. Blank cards
must be kept secure and access limited. Cards may be
purchased ($.50) and value added by users at the
Circulation Desk. In any case, countermeasures “keep
honest persons honest.”
Video surveillance systems can reduce crimes of
opportunity, but rarely eliminate them. Strategic location of
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the cameras help to determine the success of preventing
theft. Using a cash register, and enforcing tight procedures,
for collection of fines and lost book payments, help limit,
but does not totally curtail, the potential for employee theft.
Theft in the public areas of the library like the stacks or
large study spaces are most often crimes of opportunity
involving unattended backpacks, purses, laptops, or cell
phones. A thief can easily spot and take such things,
particularly when there are few patrons around who might
observe the theft. We addressed this matter in 2003 by
installing a video surveillance system. At that time, a
university police officer helped to design and install the
library’s analog surveillance system. We were careful to
have every entrance, exit, and elevator under view. The
library has a large art gallery, so several cameras were
installed in the gallery to protect the art, as well as to assure
artists that their works were relatively safe although we do
not employ a guard. Cameras with wide angle lenses were
installed in some stack areas.
Since the analog cameras were installed originally, the
library upgraded to a digital system that stores the images
on centralized servers and permit real-time access to
university police. Signs are posted throughout the library
that video surveillance is being used. Perpetrators caught
stealing laptops initially, for example, have mostly been
individuals from the Mobile community who intentionally
came to steal laptops and re-sell them. Consequently,
laptop theft has diminished, so the authors believe that the
deterrence value of surveillance systems cannot be
emphasized enough.
Most crimes committed in the Marx Library stacks are
indeed crimes of opportunity. These include theft of
backpacks, purses, clothing, unattended laptops, cell
phones, flash drives and of course library materials (books,
media, and other materials). Perpetrators run the gamut,
including students, staff, faculty, and community members.
Although none of the libraries are in danger of flood
waters, there are periodic leaks due to the flat roofs and
from heating and air (HVAC) systems. When there are rain
storms in Mobile, the circulation staff in Marx Library
frequently need to cover book stacks on the top floor, as
well as other locations on the first floor. Plastic tarps are
kept available for that purpose. Beyond this, however, the
university’s facilities staff are called to repair HVAC and
roof leak problems. That is, library employees are not
encouraged or required to make repairs.
Technical Services Department
Technical services at the Marx library is comprised of two
sections, Cataloging and Collection Management /
Acquisitions. They have different risks: (a) Employees
ordering books or materials for themselves through the
library, (b) Employees stealing new books or materials
before they are cataloged and on the shelves, (c)
Unauthorized people accessing staff-only areas and stealing
materials or personal items and (d) Injury occurring when
moving heavy boxes of materials.

Keeping doors closed, and locking up vulnerable areas and
materials, minimizes casual theft as does separating the
individual processes and procedures across the sections
(cataloging, acquisitions, receiving and mailroom). In other
words, taking such countermeasures is a form of checks
and balances. No one person is responsible for the entire
process. We further limit access by only opening boxes of
materials that can be handled in one sitting. If something
interferes, and staff are unable to completely process a box,
they are required to tape it back up until processing can be
finished. Basically this reduces the opportunity for casual
theft.
Following strict procedures to maintain a paper trail
through acquisitions to cataloging, and promptly stamping
materials with the library ownership stamp when received
also reduces the opportunity for theft. High value items are
kept in a large walk in vault in the Marx Library or in the
McCall Archives. Procedures to document access to the
vault are also strictly enforced.
Other risks involve activities that may result in injuries.
Encouraging staff to use carts or load bearing tools when
moving materials also reduces potential injuries. Training
on how to properly lift, as well as the safe use of box
cutters and other sharp tools to minimize the chance of a
cutting injury are important countermeasures.
University Archives
Unlike other library departments, the Doy Leale McCall
Rare Book and Manuscript Library (McCall Library) has
collections that contain valuable artifacts and materials.
When McCall Library was moved into a renovated space in
the Marx Library in 2016, the architects, library
administration, security office, computer center staff, risk
assessment officer, and others reviewed the plans with risk
assessment and prevention clearly in mind. Nonetheless,
theft or loss of rare and high value items is a constant
possibility for a variety of reasons including that materials
in this area, are not stamped, barcoded, or tattle taped.
While catalog records may establish provenance of an item,
or help in identification of items, they are not much help
deterring theft. Lack of adequate preservation may also
contribute to the loss of these materials.
McCall Library countermeasures are more extensive than
for the rest of the library. This department has increased
physical security (barriers, locks and limited access) as well
as state-of-the-art video surveillance. Again, as there is no
staff dedicated to active monitoring of the surveillance
system, it is a passive system, good only after a loss or
damage has occurred. Other measure include: (a) an
independent climate control system to help preserve fragile
materials, and (b) enforced use of other positive measures
such as cloth gloves and archival boxes, or other storage
materials to help reduce deterioration of archival
collections/materials. Patrons may only access these
materials in a controlled area, a reading room. Additionally,
users are banned from using pens and other potentially
damaging devices. Access to the archives and collections is
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strictly controlled and monitored. Patrons using the reading
room are not allowed to bring in bags, briefcases etc. They
may bring in paper and pencils.
Other library areas
Marx Library contains two public art galleries that feature
exhibits by local and regional artists. The main gallery is
located on the third floor and also has twelve glass display
cases that often features photographs, crafts, jewelry, and
other artifacts. Both galleries, including the display cases,
are under video surveillance. The cameras are very visible
intentionally. No security guard is provided at any time. In
another area of the library, an original Rembrandt etching is
on permanent display and the Risk Office required that a
specialty lock be installed; it is also under video
surveillance at all times. Although the video surveillance
system is the only counter measure, there have been no
thefts of art to date.
Failure to return interlibrary loan materials has costs and
can impact the reputation of the Library. Because material
to be picked-up is behind a secured door during evening
and weekend hours, there have been no instances of theft.
The staff in this department have a very good tracking
system as well.
The Marx Library’s auditorium contains audio-visual
equipment which would be very expensive to replace if
stolen or damaged. Anytime this equipment is requested,
the requestor is asked to arrive early to have his/her
presentation loaded to the workstation ahead of time and
learn how to operate the equipment if necessary. Risk is
further minimized because the dean’s staff carefully
monitor requests for reservations. If a group previously
caused damage to equipment of the facility, for instance,
the policy is to deny future requests.
Marx Library’s electronic instruction room contains thin
clients and workstations, two flat screen televisions, a
projector and an instructor’s computer/workstation. To
replace or repair this equipment would be expensive. Risk
is minimized by limiting access to library instructors. That
is, regular university classes are never scheduled in this
classroom.
Public institutions are often self-insured; this is an added
vulnerability. Self-insurance does not mean that there is a
lack of insurance. Rather, being self-insured is a conscious
decision to accept risks, quantify them, and create a reserve
to cover the identified risks when there are claims.
Most libraries will assume the risk of lost books,
computers, supplies, and so on. It would not be costeffective to pay insurance premiums to cover the cost of
most lost books, even though some rare books and
manuscripts might be of value to collectors and others. This
is the case with many items in the Doy Leale McCall Rare
Book and Manuscript Library. One collection alone was
appraised in the millions. The university’s risk and
insurance program would account for such loss.
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For example, there are more than 13,000 cellulose nitrate
portraits in the Erik Overbey Collection which was
acquired in 1978 and housed in the McCall Library in a
separate, temperature controlled room. Special containers
were fabricated locally to safely move the collection to
Marx Library, as well as safely store the nitrate collections.
The collection is also being digitized to limit access to this
fragile collection.
Conclusions
The purpose of this case study was to identify vulnerable
areas and countermeasures to reduce risks. The authors
include examples from nearly every department in Marx
Library, the main library at USA. However, no one plan
can address every possible scenario that may arise. A
central purpose of discussing risks and countermeasures
with department heads is to bring awareness of
vulnerabilities, then develop ways to eliminate or reduce
risks. Countermeasures must fit the actual situation that
occurs, as well as the budget available to implement them.
In any case, identifying risks is the starting point. Risk
assessment studies should be done periodically throughout
library departments because new risks not only arise, but
also new countermeasures are likely to be needed, or old
ones adapted. Video surveillance technology, for example,
advances significantly every five or so years and cameras
will need to be replaced. Analog networks are no longer
being supported at USA for instance.
Plan what to do in case of emergency. Decide ahead of time
who is responsible for specific tasks in an emergency.
Strictly enforce policy and procedures. Train staff how to
respond to different types of emergencies. For example,
each public service desk is stocked with cans of wasp spray
to thwart an active shooter. Wasp spray has a great range
and is incapacitating without requiring special skills, but is
not lethal.
Identify vulnerable areas and effective countermeasures.
These include area/sections that have only one way in/out,
as well as those offices and areas that have glass fronts, or
those areas that are not supervised (mailroom). Some areas
of any library are simply more vulnerable than others.
Constant coming and going of authorized staff/workers
complicates securing these areas. In the case of the Marx
Library, the receiving area requires a key to turn off the
internal door alarm and a key to open the external doors
into the area. Constant reminders only go so far. Vendors
are asked to use the main entrances to the library rather
than the receiving area. Such security measures do not
solve the problem for university staff working for facilities
engineering, or even the Computer Support Center. Have
student assistants wear something that easily identifies
them such as badges.
General areas, need to be considered for risk as well.
Reducing risk is possible by training staff to recognize risks
and take action when encountered. Similarly,
implementation of video surveillance also helps.
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The authors found that fixing or replacing faulty door
hardware and locks is an easy, but often overlooked,
security measure. For example, there was a large gap
between the wood doors leading into the cataloging
department. All a thief had to do to gain access was to use a
thin object to release the bolt. Installing a metal strip to
block the gap now prevents access. So, it is very important
to encourage the replacement of faulty door hardware.
Improving communications within or from the library is
also important. This might be as simple as the installation
of telephones that ring directly to the circulation desk. Such
phones could be located throughout the stacks and on all
floors. Library administration is determining the feasibility
of doing so because it is expected to help reduce risk and
also expedite reporting of problems. A related step would
be to post emergency telephone numbers at these sites. So,
while nearly all students have cell phones to report
problems in public areas of the libraries, having telephones
and emergency numbers should allow quicker notification
and, hence, quicker reaction by police, staff, or other first
responders.
Part of the problem of managing risk is getting the
information to the right people in a timely manner. The
appropriate action is more than a mere phone call.
Encourage people to report incidents, share information,
log elevator problems, etc. Staff are the first line of
defense. Make sure staff know the applicable policies. It
may be as simple as locking doors for areas and rooms that
are not in use all the time. This may require an investment
in new locks. Likewise, consider extending the PA system
to all staff areas. People cannot respond to emergencies if
they don’t know there is one.
Although routines and training might cause complacency,
they may also ingrain specific actions in given situations.
Routines also help reduce or manage risk. If staff are
frightened or stressed, following a routine may allow staff
to respond more quickly. In other scenarios, routines may
allow detection of problems that might otherwise go
unnoticed. Also, checking with the Safety Office on proper
procedures for inspecting fire extinguishers, and
incorporating any recommendations into library
procedures, should insure that they are in working order.
Similarly, keeping emergency procedures up-to-date and
having an active emergency committee regularly review
those procedures, will help to ensure safety. Keeping an
inventory of fire extinguishers current, for instance, will
help to insure there is an adequate number of functioning
fire extinguishers and that they are located in strategic
locations. Having functioning fire extinguishers in the right
place, however, will do little to reduce risk if staff do not
know how to use them. Our risk assessment review led to
asking the university’s fire Marshall to hold a training
session on how to use extinguishers. It was surprising how
many employees did not know how. Training, in general, is
often the most important countermeasure and way to reduce
risks. It is critical that library staff know what to do in an
emergency. Besides reviewing procedures and emergency
plans, if possible, practice.

Another key element is being able to recognize and
distinguish between library users and employees. One way
is to provide lanyards or other standard device that identify
student/staff workers. Signage will help direct library
patrons in the book stacks looking for materials to a safe
place. People might not otherwise know where to go, or
what to do, in case of an emergency. Examples include,
placing evacuation maps throughout the library, or even
post QR codes in stacks that will autodial cell phones to the
Circulation Dept.
In this day and age, it would be foolish to ignore potentially
violent situations. This category includes bomb threats,
active shooter situations, fights, vandalism, aggressive
patrons, etc. To address a potential violent situation, library
leaders need to be aware of, and plan out, what the best
response would be (as far as anyone can tell beforehand).
At a minimum, there are two Youtube films that can be
shown to employees: Auburn University’s Active Shooter
Response Training (ALICE) and UAPD Active Shooter
Video: Avoid, Deny, and Defend. The USA campus police
also led a session for library employees and showed a film.
Finally, a bomb threat was simulated and coordinated with
the police department, the Safety Office, city, county and
other offices. Such training should be scheduled
periodically so new staff are covered. Library
administrators need to realize that this training is especially
important for staff employed in the libraries’ circulation
department who work evenings and weekends.
The authors found that an area of high risk, given recent
news headlines, was bomb threats. Realizing that library
employees were never trained on how to deal with a bomb
threat, the authors decided to implement in-house training
with the help of the university police department and safety
officer. To mitigate the risk of real bomb threat, a
simulation was planned. This included a bomb threat called
into an employee at the circulation department. The
employee was told to obtain as much information as
possible from the caller: background noise, dialects,
accents, sex, etc., and inform the police of all this because
even something as innocuous as background noises may
ultimately help locate the bomb, prevent an explosion, or
reveal a hoax. Planning ahead and training staff is the
wisest choice. For example, designate a code word, that
when used, will alert employees of a bomb threat or
emergency.
Another area for employee training is the risk of active
shooters. Such situations are different in that there may not
be time to call for an orderly evacuation of the library. In
some cases evacuation may even put employees and users
in even greater danger; they should only evacuate a
building if they can do so safely. If they cannot, they may
need to hide to protect themselves. Another critical first
step is to notify the police. But a call should only be
undertaken if the employee is in a safe place and has a
phone readily available. If there is no other option but to
hide, police advocate piling furniture and whatever else is
available to block the shooter. Police recommend fighting
back in dire circumstances. Throwing books or other
objects at the shooter long enough to distract or disable him
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may provide enough time for employees and users to
escape. In the event that the situation is happening in
another building on campus, the library must be able to
secure the building and wait for the police to give the all
clear.
Recommendations
Risks in any academic library need to be considered when
making decisions. Risks also need to be periodically
assessed, particularly when technology changes,
renovations occur, or other circumstances warrant. The risk
assessment case study presented here occurred because a
risk consultant was hired by the university to determine
university wide risks. The libraries at the University of
South Alabama were included because of a planned
renovation allowing the Doy Leale McCall Rare Book and
Manuscript Library to move into the main (Marx) library.
Another reason was the collection of money for fines, lost
books, interlibrary loans, and so forth. In any case, what
library administration and department heads learned during
this time needs to applied periodically—perhaps a three,
four or five year review using the same methodology.

Many colleges and universities, including the University of
South Alabama, have implemented security alert systems to
facilitate prompt notification when dangerous situations
arise. These systems don’t negate the need to plan and train
library employees for emergencies in order to protect
people, materials and facilities. As problematic as it may
be, risk management should not be overlooked. While it is
difficult to anticipate the violence someone may do, or to
avoid a theft, library administration can, and should,
identify areas and implement procedures that take
advantage of the library’s strengths to prevent theft, or to
minimize harm to people, and damage to library materials.
Risk assessments may be organized by departments and use
department heads to help facilitate them, as well as
developing and maintaining procedures and countermeasures to limit risk. All countermeasures are likely to
need updating as technology and the availability of
products on the market change. Hopefully the information
outlined in this article and in resources identified in the
literature review will help. Working with safety compliance
officers and maintenance staff should not be overlooked.
Finally, risk assessment should not be regarded as a task
that may need to be checked off but, rather a process that
should be employed by library administration to protect the
safety of library staff and users.
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APPENDIX
Risks and vulnerabilities

Countermeasures

Leaks

Initiate a phone tree so key personnel are informed.
Pre-position tarps, mops and buckets so they can be easily
accessed.
Provide list of key campus contacts, with phone
numbers/email addresses.

Art works

Consider installing anti-theft devices and video surveillance
system when applicable.
Consider installing anti-theft devices and video. surveillance
system. Consider replacing workstations with thin-clients.
Inspect locks and repair or replace damaged hardware.
Install window treatments to limit visibility of room
contents.
Periodically inventory keys assigned to staff and faculty.
Establish procedures for securing building at closing.
Consult with university safety office about proper storage,
use, policies, etc.
Periodically inventory storage closets so it is known what
Hazmet materials are stored properly in the library.
Follow university emergency response and recovery
procedures and policies for power outages, fire, flooding,
weather, bomb, terrorist, hazmet, and similar incidents.
Otherwise, follow best practices. Have basic supplies onhand for immediate recovery.
Consider range of measures from installing signage, antitheft devices/locks and video surveillance to purchasing
lockable cabinets.
Protect patrons and staff.
Contact campus police.
In extreme cases, evacuate the building but only if
possible to do safely
If threat is phoned in, get as much information as you
possible from the caller.
Contact campus police.
Initiate evacuation of the library.
People should be moved away from the building to safe
areas.

Computer hardware and software
Doors and windows

Hazmet (storage & use of chemicals)

Natural disasters and emergencies

Theft

Violence

Bomb threat
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